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RECENT DECISIONS
The grounds for this criterion are that it is unjust for one guilty
party, the plaintiff, to suffer while the defendant who is in part
delicto is rewarded; and that the penalty of not being able to
maintain the action is utterly disproportionate to the offense.
Although Professor Wigmore's statement may appear correct
it must be remembered that the public must also be protected.
The question to be answered, in these cases, is whether the court
is going to avail itself of every opportunity to discourage fraudulent
conveyances. If the answer is in the affirmative the plaintiff
should not prevail, regardless of the nature or form of the action.41
The courts should not allow a wrongdoing plaintiff to prevail
merely because his pleadings follow a seemingly correct analytical
approach. Although the defense of unclean hands does have
its pitfalls, its application will notify debtors that a court will not
sanction the circumvention of the fraudulent conveyance laws.
By limiting the applicability of this defense the Court is not
promoting justice but sanctioning its circumvention. It is endorsing
a method by which a debtor can invoke the judicial machinery to
evade his obligation to his creditor.42
x
PROCEDURE- SERVICE OF PROCESS - DESIGNATION OF AGENT
IN CONTRACT HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE
ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR ACTUAL NOTICE. - Plaintiff, a Del-
aware corporation doing business in New York, entered into a
leasing contract with defendants, Michigan farmers. The contract
was signed in Michigan and mailed to New York by defendants.
A contract clause appointed a New York resident, the wife of
one of the officers of the plaintiff corporation, as defendants' agent
for service of process. There was no contractual provision for
(1950) ; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21; WADE, Restitution of Benefits
Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 301-05
(1947).
41 See REsTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 46, 140 (1937).
42 Predicated on the holding of the principal case, a debtor could fraud-
ulently convey his property and have the court aid him in his act. That is,
a debtor could change the name of the owner of the property on the record,
while retaining the deed. After an accord with his creditor he would
institute an action to clear cloud on title. The debtor might also convey
to a third party. The third party would then record the deed and sim-
ultaneously reconvey to the debtor. The debtor would then hold the deed
without recording until he reaches an accord with his creditors.
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the forwarding of any summons and complaint to defendants.'
The agent was not aware of the contract at the time it was ex-
ecuted. Plaintiff served the agent and the agent promptly forwarded
service to the defendants. In reversing the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit,2 the Supreme Court held that there was
a valid agency for service of process created by the contract and
that there need not be provision for transmission of such service
to the principal. National E'quip. Rental, Ltd. v. Saukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964).
In order for a court to be able to adjudicate the rights of
parties, it must have jurisdiction over the persons involved, other-
wise any judgment subsequently rendered is void.3  The court
in order to exercise this in personam jurisdiction must find that
the individual had certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.4
Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that one can obtain in personam jurisdiction over a defend-
ant by serving his agent "authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process." To comply with due process,
the service on an agent must be reasonably calculated to be brought
to the defendant's attention so that he will have sufficient notice
and an adequate opportunity to be heard.6  Additionally, the
agent must have no interests conflicting with those of his
principal. 7
By actually appointing an agent in a foreign jurisdiction to
receive service one is, in effect, consenting to be sued 8 in that
"This agreement shall be deemed to have been made in . . . New
York . . . and shall be interpreted, and the rights and liabilities of the
parties here determined, in accordance with the laws of the State of New
York; and the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first
Street, Long Island City, N. Y., as agent for the purpose of accepting
service of any process within the State of New York." National Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 313 n.3 (1964).2 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1962).
3 1 WEiNsTrN, KORN & MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRAcTIcE 1 301.01
(1963).
4 Id. at 1301.03.
5FF. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
6 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Tarbox v. Walters, 192 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Underwood
v. McBr;de, 182 F. Supp. 361 (D. Del. 1960).
7Hartsock v. Commodity Credit Corp., 10 F.R.D. 181, 184 (S.D.
Iowa 1950); MEcHEm, AGENcY § 298 (3d ed. 1928).
8 "Citizens of different states may, if they deem it desirable, agree that
any disputes arising out of a commercial transaction between them shall
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state of one of the parties."
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir.
1956). It has long been recognized that one can consent to be sued in a
foreign jurisdiction. E.g., Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphee, 326 U.S.
438 (1946); Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165
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jurisdiction.9 This eliminates the necessity for serving the prin-
cipal within the confines of the forum state, thereby facilitating
the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant. Con-
sent to be sued in a particular state constitutes consent to be sued
in the federal courts of that state as well as the state courts.10
To constitute an agency relationship there must be a man-
ifestation of consent by the principal that the agent is to act for
him n and an acceptance by the agent to so act.12  "Consent is
the basis of authority," 13 but this need not be express, for the
actual appointment can be inferred from the facts and circum-
stances. 14
While one may be an agent for some purposes, he need not
be an agent for service of process. Thus, one must first determine
if the agency relation exists and then ascertain its extent. In the
case of Fleming v. Malouf,15 defendant left the state and directed
his tenants to pay rent to his real estate agent who had the power
to pay bills and supervise the management of the building.
When the question arose as to whether the agent could be served
with process, it was held that there was no "actual" appointment
for the purpose of service of process. Another case wherein a
court did not find an agency for service was Osterling v. Con-
monwealth Trust Co.' In that case, a South Carolina resident
gave his co-executor, the defendant, a power of attorney which
authorized him "to accept service of any summons or suit arising
in any manner out of the administration of the Estate of F. J.
(1939); De Dood v. Pullman Co., 57 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1932); Emerson
Radio & Phonograph Corp. v. Callander Distrib. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 926
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Among the methods by which a person can consent are appearance,
waiver of service, stipulation in a contract, actual appointment of an agent
to receive process, carrying on business and state statute. Note, 44 HARv.
L. Ray. 1275, 1276 n.2 (1931).
9He also waives his venue rights to be sued in the district of either
the plaintiff's or the defendant's residence and can be sued in any district
within the state. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra note
8; Owens v. Harkens, 18 F.R.D. 62 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
10Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, supra note 8. "[T]he appoint-
ment of an agent by a foreign corporation to receive service . . . removes
all questions as to jurisdiction over the person where service is duly made
on that agent." Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
" In re Zacoum's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Surr. Ct. 1952) ; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY §§ 1, 7(b), 15, 26(a) (1958); MECHEm, AGENCY §23
(4th ed. 1952).
12 Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763
(1902).
13 MECHEm, op. cit. supra note 11.
14 Rubenstein v. Small, 273 App. Div. 102, 75 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dep't
1947) ; MEcHmE, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 24.
157 F.R.D. 56 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
16 35 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
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Osterling, Deceased." 17 The court held that the defendant right-
fully refused to accept service of process as agent of his co-
executor where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and his
principal were tortfeasors. The power of attorney "was quite
evidently designed . . . to facilitate the administration of the
estate . ." ' but the intention of the principal did not include
appointing defendant as his agent for service of process generally.
It is apparent that the courts will not find an agent as an agent
for service where the latter form of agency is not shown to be
expressly intended by the principal. 19
Most jurisdictions have provided for a statutory designation
of an agent for service of process. 20  The consent of the
principal can be either express, as by formal filing in the designated
state office, or implied from designated acts committed within the
state.21  In the case of Wuchter v. Pizzutti,22 the Court held a
New Jersey out-of-state motorist statute, which did not require
the secretary of state to forward the process to the defendant,
unconstitutional because it deprived him of his property without
due process of law. A statute requiring a designation of an agent
must contain a reasonable provision for notice to be transmitted
to the defendant, "otherwise . . . it will be entirely possible .
[to] obtain a default judgment against a non-resident . . ."23
without his ever receiving notice of the pending suit. This is
logical, for while such statutes may constitute constructive appoint-
ment of an agent for service of process, in many instances the
defendant may not actually know of such statutory designation.2 4
Often the sole link between defendant-principal and agent, when
the principal has not formally designated the agent, is the statute.
Likewise, the sole source of the agent's duties is also statutory,
and if the statute does not provide for notifying the principal it is
possible that such notice may never be forwarded. This would
be a violation of due* process. 25
Prior to the present case, the Wuchter principle was thought
to apply to private contracts.2 6 In the principal case, one of the
clauses of the contract between plaintiff and defendants designated
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 705.
19 United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956) (wherein
the court did imply an agency for service of process).2 0 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 304; ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.13(Smith-Hurd 1957).2 1 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAmc LAW § 253.
22276 U.S. 13 (1928).
23 Id. at 19.24 Supra note 21.25 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).2 6 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Moore and Smith, J.J.).
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the agent for service of process upon the defendants. This appears
to be the first Supreme Court case which has adjudicated the
legality of such contractual designation, wherein there was no
provision for notice to be forwarded to the principal. The
Court in the principal case held that as long as the contract
is not excessively lengthy and the clause appointing the agent
is not buried in the extra-fine print, there need be no provision
for transmission of service. It is to be noted that in this case
notice was forwarded; if notice were not forwarded it might
have invalidated the agency. However, the Court did not concern
itself with this possibility, stating that "no due process claim has
been made." 27
Designation of an agent is not sufficient to establish the
agency relation, since there must be an acceptance by the agent.
In the present situation, how could the agent accept the de-
fendants' offer when she was not aware that the plaintiff and
defendants had even entered into a contract? The Supreme Court
held that the agent's instantaneous compliance with her agency
responsibilities, i.e., "prompt acceptance and transmittal" 28 to the
defendants of the summons and complaint, constituted the validation
of the agency, in that her acts manifested her acceptance. 29 This
raises the question as to whether she would have been the defend-
ants' agent if she had not "promptly" forwarded the summons
and complaint. The Court, however, did not set any standard for
determining what is "promptly."
It is an elementary principle of the law of agency that an
agent must not have a conflict of interest with his principal. 30
However, in the present case where the defendants' agent was
also the wife of one of the officers of the plaintiff corporation,
the Court said "an agent with authority so limited can in no
meaningful sense be deemed to have an interest antagonistic to
the respondents, since both the petitioner and the respondents
had an equal interest in assuring that, in the event of litigation,
the latter be given that adequate and timely notice which is a
prerequisite to a valid judgment." 31
This case indicates that an individual may consent in advance,
by contract, to the in personam jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal
2 7 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315 (1964).
28 Ibid.
29 The Supreme Court did indicate that under New York law the pro-
vision would be valid. The more recent New York cases have held that a
contractual designation of an agent for service of process does not violate
the due process clause even where the principal was a non-resident.
E.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Graphic Art Designers, Inc., 36 Misc.
2d 442, 234 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Emerson Radio & Phonograph
Corp. v. Eskind, 32 Misc. 2d 1038, 228 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
30 Supra note 7.
3 1 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, supra note 27, at 317-18.
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and that the contract need not contain a provision requiring notice
to be transmitted to him. The designated tribunal can then
adjudicate any conflicts arising out of their contractual relationship.
In the present case, this consent was achieved through use of
a contractual designation of an agent for service of process in such
foreign formn. The Court stated that due process was satisfied
even though the contract did not provide for notice to be given
to the defendants. The principal case would not appear to
sustain jurisdiction on similar facts if no effort is made to give
the defendant actual notice. However, the Court did not consider
a situation in which no such notice had been given.
It is now certain that such in personam jurisdiction can be
obtained in the chosen forum without violating due process. That
conclusion has no bearing, however, on the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, which may cause the court to refuse to entertain
the case though it has unquestionably acquired jurisdiction.3 2
It is probable that the state courts will now more readily
uphold the validity of such contractual designation. Since the
constitutionality of this clause has been upheld we can expect
an ever increasing use of such consent jurisdiction.
M
SECURITIES - INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT- "SCALPING" HELD
TO BE FRAUDULENT PRACTICE.- Defendant, a registered advisory
service,' published a report which apprised its five thousand 2
subscribers of the investment potential of particular stocks. The
service, on at least five occasions, purchased listed stocks and,
without disclosing these prior purchases, recommended such stocks
for long-term investment. Following each recommendation the
price of such shares rose, and within two weeks the defendant
sold its shares at a substantial profit. The SEC, alleging violation
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [hereinafter referred to
as the Act] commenced a proceeding to enjoin this practice.
32 Emerson Quiet Kool Corp. v. Eskind, 32 Misc. 2d 1037, 228 N.Y.S.2d
839 (Sup. Ct 1957).
1 "'Invqstment Adviser' means any person who, for compensation, en-
gages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publica-
tion or writings, as to the value of securities. . . ." Investment Advisers
Act §202 (a)(ll), 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80b-2 (11) (1958).
It is unlawful for an unregistered investment adviser to use the mails or
any other means of interstate commerce in connection with his advisory
business. Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3 (a) (1958).
2 On several occasions the report was distributed to an additional 100,000
non-subscribers. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
612 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., dissenting), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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